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The matching function is a modeling device designed to capture the process through which the
supply and demand sides are brought together in a frictional market. In a labor market context,
the matching function maps the stock of job seekers and the stock of vacant jobs at any given date
into the number of jobs (or \matches" between vacant jobs and job seekers) formed at that date
(Pissarides, 2000). The matching function is the centerpiece of countless quantitative contributions
to the broad eld of macro-labor, some aiming to explain aggregate uctuations in hours, wages, and
other macro variables, others aiming to evaluate some policy, others still focusing on the allocation
of the workforce between dierent regions or industries...
All those quantitative contributions have to rely on values of the matching function elasticities
with respect to the numbers of vacant jobs and job seekers. Those elasticities have been and
continue to be the focus of a large body of empirical work, which keeps expanding as better and
more abundant data on job vacancies become available. In this paper, we argue that existing
estimates of the matching function elasticities are likely to be exposed to an endogeneity bias
arising from the search behavior of agents on either side of the market. We oer an estimation
method which, under certain assumptions, is immune from that bias. We apply our method to the
estimation of a very simple version of the matching function using aggregate U.S. data from the
Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS). Results suggest that the bias is quantitatively
important. For example, under the (common) assumption of constant returns to scale, an OLS
estimate of the aggregate matching function elasticity w.r.t. vacancies based on the JOLTS series
available at the time of writing is around 0.82. Our proposed estimate is around 0.68.1
From a theoretical standpoint, the source of bias that we highlight is very straightforward.
The matching function takes job vacancies as one of its inputs. Vacancies are posted by prot
maximizing rms. The returns to posting a vacancy depend on the eciency of the matching
process. Therefore, random shocks to matching eciency aect the number matches formed both
directly through the matching technology and indirectly through rms' vacancy-posting behavior
| very much like TFP shocks aect aggregate production both directly and indirectly through the
demand for inputs. Hence, job vacancies are endogenous, and an estimation strategy consisting
of, say, running OLS regressions of the number of new matches on measures of the numbers of job
seekers and job vacancies (a common strategy in the literature) fails to account for that endogeneity.
Yet, numbers based on such OLS estimates are routinely used to calibrate matching models in
which labor demand is explicitly endogenous, typically through a free entry condition (rms post
job vacancies as long as the expected value of doing so is positive).2
1So the bias is positive in this case. While that particular OLS estimator is very commonly used in the literature,
other estimators have also been implemented, leading to dierent biases with dierent signs. We provide an extensive
discussion of those dierent estimators below.
2Many of those papers revolve around the model developed by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
2Perhaps surprisingly, the source of bias we identify in this paper has been largely ignored in
the matching function estimation literature, which has mainly been concerned with other potential
sources of bias such as time aggregation or imperfect input measurement, or with fundamental
specication issues (such as the relevance of stock-ow matching).3 While we do recognize the
importance of those various issues, we set them aside in this paper and focus on the source of
endogeneity described above.
Recent papers have used lags of the matching function's inputs as instruments for their own
current values. Depending on the assumptions made about the process of matching eciency
shocks, some of the resulting estimates may coincide with ours. However our focus is dierent
from that of these papers as we highlight the role of the free entry condition, or more generally of
endogenous search behavior on one or both sides of the market, as potential sources of simultaneity.4
By explicitly modeling the response of labor demand to matching eciency shocks, we make the
source of endogeneity explicit which allows us to justify our instrumentation strategy within the
structure of a general search and matching model.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give a brief formal account of the endogeneity
of vacancies using a stripped-down, standard labor-matching model. In Section 3 we show how to
consistently estimate the matching function within the model of Section 2, imposing some structure
on the matching eciency shock. Section 4 gives a brief description of the data. Results are then
set out in Section 5 and further discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Statement of the Problem
2.1 A Simple Matching Model
Although in principle the argument that we make in this paper applies to any matching model, in
order to make our point with minimal peripheral complication we shall focus on the simplest | and
perhaps most widely considered | case of an aggregate matching function m() that determines
the number of matches formed between unemployed job seekers and vacant jobs. Specically, the
number M of such matches formed in a given month is related to the number of unemployed
workers, U, and job vacancies, V , at the beginning of that month, in the following way:
M = m(U;V ) = AUV ; (1)
3See the surveys by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) and Yashiv (2007). Burdett, Coles and van Ours (1994)
oer a very clear and insightful discussion of time aggregation in matching models. An empirical analysis of the time
aggregation bias is conducted by Berman (1997). Anderson and Burgess (2000), Fahr and Sunde (2005) and Sunde
(2007) quantify the bias arising from incomplete or imperfect input measurement. Gregg and Petrongolo (2005)
and Coles and Petrongolo (2008) oer an empirical investigation of the stock-ow matching hypothesis, whereby the
number of matches formed at any date is jointly determined by the stock of job seekers and the inow of new job
vacancies into the search market.
4Yashiv (2000) conducts a structural estimation of an equilibrium search and matching model. Sedl a cek (2010)
analyzes the eciency of the matching function while accounting for unobserved job vacancies. Lastly, Barnichon and
Figura (2011) study the eect of unemployment composition and dispersion of labor market conditions on matching
eciency.
3where to further x ideas we follow the vast majority of empirical studies of the matching function in
assuming a Cobb-Douglas functional form.5 An important feature of (1) is the presence of a shifter,
A, which has a random component capturing random shocks to the matching technology. Those
shocks parallel TFP shocks hitting the aggregate production function: they can be interpreted as
recruitment-sector specic productivity shocks caused, for example, by changes in ICT aecting the
way jobs are advertised or applied for, or by policy shocks aecting the functioning of employment
agencies, or by changes in the geographic mobility of the workforce...In this paper we will refer to
A as the \reallocation shock", for want of a better term.
We further assume that the matching function exhibits Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) so
that  = 1   .6 In this case, and with random matching | whereby all job seekers (vacant jobs)
have equal sampling probability | the matching function can be redened in terms of a job seeker's





where  = V=U is labor market tightness. The job nding rate is the probability for any unem-
ployed worker to nd a job in the current month.7
The standard matching model (see e.g. Pissarides, 2000) is closed by assuming free entry and
exit of rms in the search market. While there are alternatives to the free entry assumption as
a way to model labor demand (mostly involving some adjustment cost of vacancies), we choose
to focus on the free entry assumption as it is used in the overwhelming majority of applications.
Under free entry, rms post vacancies at a ow cost of C per month until prot opportunities from





where  is the present discounted value (PDV) of a lled and producing job in the typical rm.
The interpretation of (3) is that employers equate the marginal ow cost of posting a vacancy (the
constant C) to the expected marginal return of doing so, which equals the value of a lled job, ,
times the probability of lling the job, which from a rm's perspective equals M=V under random
matching. Further note that, with CRS in matching, that probability is also a function of labor






5Implicit in (1) is the additional assumption that unemployed workers all look for jobs with the same xed intensity.
It is conceptually straightforward to extend our point to the case of endogenous search intensity.
6CRS is a theoretically desirable property for the aggregate matching function, and is indeed assumed in a vast
majority of theoretical applications, as well as in many empirical studies of the matching function. Yet an important
body of empirical literature has been concerned with testing the assumption of CRS.
7Note that, in a discrete time model as the one considered in this paper, a constraint should be added to (2) to
ensure that F is always less than one. We follow conventional practice and ignore that constraint, assuming that A
and  takes on values that are consistent with F  1.
4Given the number of unemployed job seekers U, rms post more vacancies if the PDV of employing
a worker, , is higher, or if the cost of posting a vacancy, C, is lower, or if the eciency of the
matching technology, A, is currently higher.
2.2 Endogeneity of Labor Market Tightness
Taking logs in (2) and using lower case letters to denote logarithms, one obtains a convenient linear
relationship between f and :
f =  + a: (5)
The focus of a large part of the empirical literature on the matching function | and that of this
paper | is to obtain an estimate of . The common approach to this problem is to use measures
of f and  to estimate (5) by OLS. If free entry holds, however, this approach will fail to deliver
a consistent estimate of  as (4) clearly implies that  is correlated with a.8 Rewriting (4) in log
terms yields:
 =
   c + a
1   
; (6)
so that Cov(;a) 6= 0 in general. Intuitively, the reallocation shocks aects the job nding rate
both directly by changing the eciency of the matching process, and indirectly by aecting the
employers' incentives to post vacant jobs. In spite of this potential source of bias originating from
the free entry condition, estimates of  based on OLS regressions of f on  are routinely used to
calibrate matching models in which the free entry condition is assumed to hold.9
We now show how the endogeneity of  can be overcome by imposing some structure on the
process of reallocation shocks.
3 The Statistical Model
3.1 Specication
We propose to estimate the matching function using monthly time series observations of the job
nding rate and labor market tightness. Introducing a time index t, which becomes necessary at
this juncture, we now decompose the reallocation shock at as follows: at = +t +t, where  is a
constant, t is a seasonal dummy, and t is an unobserved component. Rewriting equation (5), we
obtain:
ft =  + t + t + t: (7)
8Notable exceptions to the OLS-in-levels approach are discussed below. For example, some authors have estimated
a rst-dierenced version of (5) by OLS. As we show below, this approach is also exposed to a simultaneity bias.
9As briey mentioned in the Introduction, many papers in the matching function estimation literature have
addressed potential simultaneity biases originating from measurement problems, as well as temporal aggregation
biases. The problem we address in this paper is clearly distinct and, in principle, cannot be solved by recourse to
better or higher frequency data.





`t ` + !t , P (L)t = !t; (8)
where L is the lag operator, P (L) := 1 
Pp
`=1 `L`, and !t is a serially uncorrelated disturbance.10
3.2 Estimation
Applying the transformation P (L) to (7), using (8) and re-arranging we obtain our main equation
of interest for the estimation:
ft =  +
p X
`=1
`ft ` + t  
p X
`=1







 and ` = ` for all `. With serially uncorrelated !t's, estimation of
this latter model can be based on the moment conditions E(!tt `) = 0 for all `  1. While t
is still endogenous in (9) as a consequence of free entry, the structure imposed on the reallocation
shock implies that its own lags are valid instruments for t.11 How strong those instruments are
will depend on the amount of persistence in the various components of  | see equation (6) |
and will be assessed in the estimation.
In this simple case of serially uncorrelated !t's, only t is endogenous in (9). Thus in principle
we only need one excluded instrument for identication. Because all lags of t are valid instruments,
the model is overidentied.
4 Data
We take our measures of job vacancies and matches formed from the Job Openings and Labor
Turnover Survey (JOLTS). JOLTS oers an aggregate time series of job openings and hires covering
the U.S. non-farm sector starting December 2000 and ending in February 2011 at the time of writing.
The \job openings" variable (our measure of vacancies) is a count of all positions that are open on
the last business day of the month. The \hires" variable (our measure of matches formed) counts
all additions to the payroll during the month.12 Finally, we use data on the number of unemployed
aged 16 or over from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
The left panel on Figure 1 plots the non-seasonally adjusted time series of the job nding rate
and labor market tightness, both in log terms. The shaded areas indicate NBER-dated recessions.
10Extending the method to allow for some degree of persistence in !t by assuming it to follow an MA(q) process
is straightforward. However the data do not appear to call for this complication (see below).
11t is the only endogenous regressor under the assumption of no serial correlation in !t. Had we assumed that !t
followed an MA(q) process, we would have needed to instrument all lags of t and ft up to q and base estimation on
E(!tt `) = 0 holding for all `  q + 1. Our proposed estimation method remains valid, however, up to this simple
modication.
12See www.bls.gov/jlt/ for details.
6Figure 1: The job nding rate and labor market tightness
Apart from strong seasonality in both variables, the graph suggests the presence of two breaks
occurring around the middle of the two recessions covered by the data (September 2001 and, more
markedly, October 2008 | both breaks are materialized on the gure by vertical solid lines). The
right panel of Figure 1 is a scatter plot of the job nding rate against labor market tightness, both
in log terms. Those two series co-vary very closely and the gure provides prima facie evidence of
an ane relationship between ft and t. The right panel of Figure 1 also shows that labor market
tightness is slightly more volatile than the job nding rate.
Dickey-Fuller tests do not reject the hypothesis of a unit root in both the job nding rate and
labor market tightness. The possibly nonstationary nature of ft and t has led some authors to be
concerned about the spuriousness of the correlation between those two variables.13 As shown by
Hsiao (1997), these concerns do not apply to our structural estimation, based on a 2SLS regression
of equation (9). More specically, if ft and t are nonstationary then OLS on (7) will yield a super-
consistent estimator of a cointegrating vector for (ft;t) (see Phillips and Durlauf, 1986, or Stock,
1987). However, what we are after when estimating a matching function is not a cointegrating
relation between ft and t. Rather, we are seeking to estimate the parameter of a structural
relationship between ft and t (the matching function). In other words, at the true value of the
matching function elasticity , the residual t in (7) may not be stationary (our estimation results
will indeed show that we cannot reject nonstationarity). Hsiao (1997) shows that, in this context,
2SLS on (9) is consistent.14
13The standard strategy is then to consider a rst-dierenced version of equation (7) (see e.g. Yashiv, 2000).
14A few further subtleties arise here. The statement that the OLS estimator of the regression coecient of a
nonstationary variable yt on a nonstationary vector xt is super-consistent for a cointegrating vector for (yt;x
0
t) is
only true if the elements of xt are not themselves cointegrated. Strictly speaking, this fails to hold in our case as
the r.h.s. in (7) comprises  and month dummies, which are stationary. Following from that, note that if we take
pseudo-dierences and thus consider equation (9), we have a cointegration relation (! is stationary by assumption)
but the regressors are obviously cointegrated so OLS on (9) will also produce a biased estimate.
75 Estimation Results
5.1 Baseline Results
Table 1 shows estimation results for our baseline specication of the reallocation shock process,
which is to assume that t follows an AR(3) process, three being the highest autoregression order
which we nd to be statistically signicant in our data. All estimations are run on non-seasonally
adjusted data and include month dummies to capture seasonality. Prior seasonal adjustment of the
data would indeed create articial serial correlation in all adjusted variables which would combine
itself with the endogeneity issue we are tackling here. The results gathered in Table 1 include our
preferred estimator (column 5), as well as for a number of benchmark specications taken from the
literature. We now go over those results.
Column 1 reports estimates obtained from OLS applied to equation (7). Our OLS estimate
of  is on the high side of estimates previously obtained by other authors based on JOLTS data,
probably owing to the combined facts that the JOLTS series now covers a longer period and has
undergone a substantial revision in April 2011.15 Hall (2005) nds an elasticity of 0.77 based on
one year of JOLTS data (2002). Nagyp al (2009) nds an elasticity of total hires with respect to
vacancies (not imposing CRS) of 0.668 on seasonally adjusted data and 0.531 on non-seasonally
adjusted data. (She rejects CRS in the latter case.) Nagyp al's sample stops in November 2004.
Rogerson and Shimer (2010) nd an elasticity of 0.42 (imposing CRS) on a sample going up to
mid-2009, although they use MA-smoothed seasonally adjusted data in the regression.
For Column 2, we took rst dierences (FD) of (7) and then ran OLS. Some authors have
advocated estimating (7) in rst dierences, based on the worry that OLS estimates from the model
in levels might be spurious owing to the nonstationary nature of ft and t. The OLS estimate of 
based on the rst-dierenced version of (7) is indeed about half of that from the model in levels.
While at rst blush this may reect the spurious nature of the estimates in levels, our interpretation
is that the dierence in estimates between Columns 1 and 2 simply reect dierent biases.16
We next implement the estimator succinctly described and used by Yashiv (2000) in an eort
to \cater for nonstationarity [...] and endogeneity". Yashiv's estimator is again based on rst
dierences of (7): it consists of a 2SLS regression of ft on t, where t is instrumented by
lags of t of order 2 and above. Note that this estimator coincide with our preferred estimator
(see Section 3) if t follows a random walk. The point estimate reported in Column 3 is markedly
higher than the OLS estimate from the model in FD (Column 2), although not as high as the OLS
estimate from the model in levels. The discrepancy between the OLS and IV estimates on model
(7) in FD should arouse suspicion as to the consistency of OLS. Moreover, a Sargan test rejects the
15See www.bls.gov/jlt/ for details.
16Asymptotically (and ignoring month dummies), the bias in Column 1 converges to Cov(;a)=Var(), while the
bias in Column 2 converges to Cov(;a)=Var(). Those expressions are impossible to sign in general as they







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9consistency of the set of instruments used in Column 3.
Column 4 reports OLS estimates of (9) and is there for comparison with Column 5 (our proposed
estimator) to gauge the extent of the simultaneity bias arising from correlation between t and the
contemporaneous innovation !t. Estimates using our proposed strategy are reported in Column 5:
equation (9) is estimated by 2SLS with t instrumented by lags of t (t 4 to t 7). While our
preferred estimate of the matching function elasticity is closer to the simple OLS estimate based
on (5) in levels (Column 1) than to the one based on OLS in rst dierences (Column 2), it is still
markedly lower, meaning that the simultaneity bias aecting OLS estimates has a positive sign.
Consistency of the set of instruments that we use to produce the results in Column 5 is accepted
by a Sargan test (reported at the bottom of Column 5). The sizeable dierences between IV and
OLS estimates of (9) (Column 5 vs Column 4) as well as the reasonably large rst-stage partial R-
squared and F statistic all further suggest that we are not facing a weak instrument problem. Most
importantly, estimation of (9) by OLS produces a substantially lower value of , suggesting that
simultaneity is indeed there and quantitatively important. Finally, the common factor restriction
(CFR) ` = ` was not imposed in our estimation of (9). The restriction can be tested using a
Wald test, which is also reported in Table 1 and does not reject the restriction.17
Based on the results shown in Column 5, the hypothesis that
P3
`=1 ` = 1 cannot be rejected,
i.e. the reallocation shock t may be nonstationary.18 This restriction can be imposed in (9), which
leads to estimating the following model (with p = 3):
ft =   (1   1)ft 1   (1   1   2)ft 2
+ t +  (1   1)t 1 +  (1   1   2)t 2
+ P (L)t + !t:
We estimate this equation by 2SLS, not imposing the common factor restriction, and report the
results in Column 6. As expected, point estimates are very close to those obtained in Column 5
(with a slight gain in precision) and the common factor restriction is not rejected.
5.2 Robustness
We investigate the robustness of the results to dierent assumptions about the amount of persistence
in the reallocation shock t, to the inclusion of structural breaks in September 2001 and October
2008, and to restricting the estimation sample to a dierent sub-period. Results are gathered in
Table 2.19 We note that the conventional OLS estimate of model (7) in levels is sensitive both to
the inclusion of a structural break at the beginning of the 2008 Recession and to the inclusion of
17Because the CFR is a nonlinear restriction, the form under which we test it may matter for the Wald test (Gregory
and Veall, 1986). Here we test equality to zero of `   `. Using other forms (e.g. `=   ` = 0) leads to the same
qualitative conclusion.
18Note that, consistently with (9), the constant term is estimated at 0 in Column 4.
19The table only reports a subset of the coecients. A full table is available on request.
10the post-2008 Recession period in the estimation sample. Our IV estimate is far more robust to
these changes especially when considering our preferred specication of the residuals, AR(3).
1 2 3 4 5
OLS on (7) OLS on (7) IV on (9) assuming t is...
in FD AR(1) AR(2) AR(3)





















ft 3 | | | | 0:388
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ft 3 | | | | 0:332
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ft 3 | | | | 0:233
(:120)
Month dummies included as regressors in all specications. Structural
breaks at 2001:m9 and 2008:m10 included in bottom two panels. Excluded
instruments in columns 2-4 are t p ` for ` = 1 to 3 and p is the order
of the autoregressive component of .
Table 2: Robustness checks
6 Further Quantitative Assessment of the Bias
Whether unemployment uctuations are caused by uctuations in labor demand induced by shocks
to rms' revenues (productivity or demand shocks), or by shifts in the matching function itself (i.e.,
in the parlance of equation (2), by shifts in A), is a classic question in macro-labor (dating back to
11at least Blanchard and Diamond, 1989).20 The standard approach to addressing that question is to
pick a matching function elasticity b  (usually obtained from calibration or OLS regression), back
out the implied time series of reallocation shocks as b at = ft   b t, and look at the cyclical behavior
of that shock. In this section, we gauge the quantitative consequences of using OLS estimates of
the matching function elasticity for that exercise, as opposed to using our preferred, consistent IV
estimates.
Figure 2: Matching eciency
Figure 2 plots time series of the reallocation shock constructed from standard OLS estimates
(Table 1, Column 1) and from IV estimates (Table 1, Column 5). The OLS-based matching
eciency shows no particular trend and is somewhat countercyclical (it has a correlation of 0.31
with detrended unemployment). The IV-based matching eciency, on the other hand, does not
appear to follow any cyclical pattern, but declines steadily since the second semester of 2007. Those
two time series suggest radically dierent conclusions as to the causes of unemployment uctuations.
The OLS estimates suggests that, if anything, matching eciency improves in periods of high
unemployment, so that based on the model, high unemployment can only be due to depressed
labor demand caused by adverse productivity or demand shocks. The IV estimates, on the other
hand, suggests that matching eciency has started to slowly and steadily deteriorate round the mid
2000s, which may partly account for the slow recovery that the U.S. labor market is experiencing
at the time of writing.
20Of course a further source of confusion resides in the fact that, if labor demand is determined by a free entry
condition, then any shock to matching eciency A will induce a simultaneous response of rms' labor demand, in
addition to its direct impact on the matching function.
127 Conclusion
This paper begins by pointing out a simple implication of equilibrium matching models: the search
behavior of rms and/or job seekers implies that labor market tightness and the job nding rate
are simultaneously determined as a function of the unobserved eciency of the matching process.
As a consequence, the standard practice of regressing the job nding rate on a measure of labor
market tightness using, e.g., OLS, is exposed to a simultaneity bias. Putting some structure on the
process followed by matching eciency (or the `reallocation shock') allows us to oer a consistent
estimator of the matching function elasticity. Application of our method to the estimation of a
basic version of the matching function using JOLTS data suggests that the bias has potentially
important quantitative consequences, which we illustrate through the classic question of whether
unemployment uctuations are caused by labor demand shocks or by reallocation shocks (shifts
in the matching function itself). Based on our estimates of the matching function, we conclude
that matching eciency has indeed declined markedly since the beginning of the Great Recession,
whereas OLS-based estimates of the matching function would lead one to conclude that matching
eciency has actually improved during that recession.
In order to make our point with minimal peripheral complication, we have focused on a very
basic version of the equilibrium matching model, and deliberately abstracted from a number of
important problems analyzed elsewhere in the literature (such as time aggregation, imperfect input
measurement, or stock-ow matching). Further work is needed to examine how those sources of bias
interact with the `structural' problem of endogeneity of labor market tightness that we emphasize
in this paper.
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